Abstract: This paper examines the relation between environmental disclosures resulting from environmental legislation and the regulatory costs and level of the environmental exposure for a sample of 51 US chemical firms. The results show that environmental disclosures included as discretionary disclosures in the 10-K reports in 1984 prior to the enactment of SARA (The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1985 and 1986) are related positively to regulatory costs and the level of exposure to environmental risk as measured by the logarithm of chemical revenues. A primary contribution of this research is a verification of the discretionary disclosure and legitimacy theses.
Introduction
Research on the social responsibility accounting of firms examining the various relations between social disclosure, social performance and economic performance has been conducted since the early 1960s [1] and continues to be the subject of academic interest [2] [3] [4] . One line of research examined the potential relations between the extensiveness of a firm's social disclosure and its social performance with the hypothesis that the quantity and quality of social disclosure is positively correlated with its social performance [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Different measures of social disclosure have been used. These include:
• a social disclosure scale [13] ,
• the percentage of prose in annual reports,
• the quality of disclosure in annual reports, and
• the quantity of disclosure in annual reports.
Similarly, social performance has been measured differently as based on content analysis including:
• reputational scales using both word and page counts [ • CEP pollution information index, and
• a student evaluation of industry reputation.
The results included no correlation in four studies, negative correlation in one study, and positive correlation in three studies. The results point to two major inconsistencies:
1 lack of theory, and 2 diversity of the empirical databases examined.
This study corrects for both inconsistencies in examining the relation between environmental disclosures resulting from environmental legislation and the regulatory costs and size of the environmental exposure for a sample of 51 chemical firms. The choice of the independent variables rests on the discretionary disclosure and legitimacy theses [17, 2] . The empirical data are based on information in 10-K reports and EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) reports. The results of the study show that an environmental disclosure index, based on discretionary environmental disclosures from the 1984 10-K report, is related positively to (a) an index of regulatory costs based on three EPA measures of Superfund costs and (b) the logarithm of chemical revenues as a measure of the size of the environmental exposure.
Superfund legislation
In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act that created the Superfund to pay for cleanup and enforcement activities of hazardous waste cites. The act allowed the Federal Government to recover costs from those responsible for environmental pollution through "strict", "joint and several" and "retroactive" liability provisions. On October 17, 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) bringing four major changes to the Superfund Program. They were: 1 an increase in the Trust fund from $1.6 billion to $9 billion over five years, 2 the expansion of overall cleanup standards, 3 the provision of new enforcement authorities and settlement tools, and Both laws provided a new empirical database on environmental disclosures and regulatory costs. Therefore, the environmental disclosures in 1984, prior to the enactment of SARA, constitute a good example of discretionary environmental disclosures.
Hypotheses

Relation of environmental disclosures to regulatory costs
Environmental disclosures prior to the enactment of SARA are a form of discretionary disclosures. Two types of analytical models examined the rationale behind environmental disclosures. The first type implied that managers disclose only relatively good news [18, 17] . Verrecchia [17] imposes a constant proprietary cost of disclosure (e.g. cost associated with disclosures that provide rivals a competitive advantage) and finds that only managers with news above a threshold level will disclose their news. Similarly, Dye [18] assumes that investors are not sure about the existence of managers' private information and therefore cannot infer from no disclosure that managers are reluctant to disclose bad news. Both models imply that firms disclose relatively good news. Thus, firms with relatively good 'news' (i.e., less negative news) about their environmental efforts would have an incentive to include environmental disclosures in their financial reports proportional to their regulatory costs. Absence of such disclosure signals a higher level of exposure of environmental risk and future regulatory costs.
The second analytical model implies that managers use discretionary disclosure to affect the behaviour of product-market competitors [19-21] used Verrecchia's [17] model to endogenize proprietary disclosure costs and show that the disclosure of bad news is intended to discourage entry (see also [22] ). Dontoh's [20] model for firms in oligopolistic markets show that managers are likely to disclose good news to stockholders and bad news to competitors. The same argument is made by Newman and Sansing [21] using models in which disclosure is not limited to truthful ones. Thus, chemical firms with relatively 'bad news' about their regulatory costs would have an incentive to include proportional environmental disclosures that may affect the behaviour of product-market competitors.
The hypothesis that may be derived from both discretionary disclosure models is as follows:
H 1 : Firms include environmental disclosures in proportion to their regulatory costs.
Relation of environmental disclosure to the level of exposure to environmental risk
Corporate legitimacy has been used as an argument both for or against the need for environmental disclosure [23, 24] . Legitimacy based on a social contract between the firm and society may be viewed as market-based, thereby directing firms in social activities that are profit oriented [5, p.333]. It is also viewed as society-based in the sense that social and public pressures direct firms toward social responsibility [25, p.2]. Given that social legitimacy is a function of the public policy process, it was argued that the greater the likelihood of adverse shifts in public policy, the greater the need to use social disclosure to influence the process [3] . As a result, social disclosure in general and environmental disclosure in particular, may be used as a response to society's demands for social responsibility. Firms will use environmental disclosures as a cost-effective means of addressing the 'exposure' of the firms to the social/political climate (e.g. [23, 26] 
Empirical analysis
Sample firms
To be included in the sample, a firm must meet the following criteria: Fifty-one firms met the two criteria. They are identified in Table 1 . The year 1984 was chosen as it was the last year the environmental disclosures were still discretionary before SARA became a factor. In effect, on 22 February 1985, the Reagan administration proposed specific legislation that was signed by President Reagan on October 20, 1986. 
Measurement of environmental disclosure
The measurement of environmental disclosure is best achieved by a clear identification of specific statements in the 10-K reports on the extent of the environmental concern of the firm. It requires an identification of the areas of environmental concern and an appropriate scoring of the level of environmental disclosure. Similar to Blacconiere and Patten [4] each firm is rated on the number of areas of environmental concern it included in its 1984 10-K report. A score of one is given for each area presented or discussed in the report. The areas of environmental concern considered are: 1 Statements citing or discussing current or proposed regulations.
2 Statements on the compliance status or compliance efforts of the company relative to environmental standards. 4 Presentation of future estimates for monetary expenditures relative to environmental control. 5 Statements on current or potential environmental actions or lawsuits against the company (i.e environmental litigation disclosures).
The scores range from one to five. As in Blacconiere and Patten [4], each report was evaluated by two independent reviewers given the potential for ambiguity in evaluating environmental disclosures using content analysis.
Measurement of regulatory costs
Similar to Barth and McNichols [27] and Northcutt [28] , three alternative measures of the Superfund costs are used in this study. They are:
1 TCN: The cumulative number of Superfund Notice letters as of 1984.
2 TCRD: The total cost reported in the Records of Decisions as of 1984 across all sites for the firm. Table 2 . Our goal is to isolate the underlying construct that is common to the three measures. To this end, we use a common factor analysis to decompose each individual measure into one (or more) factor(s) common to the individual measures of regulatory costs, and an additional factor, which is unique to the specific measure alone. All the observations were subjected to factor analysis and one common factor was found to explain the interrecorrelations among the three individual measures [29] . Table 3 reports the results of the common factor analysis. One common factor appears to explain the interrecorrelations among the three variables, as the first eigenvalue alone exceeds the sum of the commonalities. The common factor is significantly and positively correlated with the three measures. A factor score is then computed for each firm as the index of regulatory cost (IRC). The total cost reported in the Records of Decisions as of 1984 across all sites in the firm. TACR:
The allocated cost reported in the Records of Decisions as of 1984 summed across all sites based on an equal allocation of the total costs among all COMPUSTAT Potentially Responsible Parties. CHEMREV: Chemical revenues in millions.
Table 3
Initial factor method: principal components prior communality estimates: ONE eigenvalues of the correlation matrix: Total = 3 Average = 1 
Measurement of the size of the environmental exposure
The size of environmental exposure is measured by the logarithm of chemical revenues rather than total revenues or ratio of chemical revenues to total revenues. The judgment was that the magnitude of chemical revenues best defines the size of the environmental exposure. The higher the chemical revenues, the higher are the activities that potentially lead to environmental exposure. We argue, ceteris paribus, that firms with larger levels of chemical revenues compared with firms with smaller levels of chemical revenues face greater public pressure.
Variables in the cross-sectional analysis
The general cross-sectional model is described as follows:
EDIj=a1+a1*IRCj +a2*LNCHEMREVj where:
EDIj=Environmental disclosure index for firm j.
IRCj=Index of regulatory cost for firm j.
LNCHEMREVj=Logarithm of chemical revenues for firm j.
EDIj is obtained from the content analysis of each firm's 10K report. IRCj is the factor score from the factor analysis of the three alternative measures of regulatory costs. 
Results
Summary and conclusions
The discretionary disclosure theses imply that the extent of discretionary disclosure is proportional to the amount of bad news. The corporate legitimacy thesis imply that the extent of discretionary disclosure is proportional to the level of exposure of the firm to the social/political climate. In the context of this study, the two hypotheses imply that the extent of environmental disclosures is proportional to regulatory costs and chemical revenues. The results of the study using data from a sample of 51 US chemical firms confirmed the two hypotheses by showing that environmental disclosures included in the 10-K reports were positively related to an index of regulatory costs and the level of exposure to environmental risk as measured by the logarithm of chemical revenues. In addition to a verification of the discretionary disclosure and the corporate legitimacy theses, the results confirm earlier studies on the relations between social disclosure and social performance [1] . The lesson that can be derived by the profession is the need for adequate matching of the quality of social disclosure with the extent of social performance.
